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The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 – Ten Years On. 
 




The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003 has now been in force in Ireland 
for ten years.  This article analyses the Act itself and the impact which it has had on the 
Irish courts during the first decade of its operation.  The use of the European Convention 
in the Irish courts prior to the enactment of the legislation is discussed, as are the reasons 
for the passing of the Act.  The relationship between the Act and the Irish Constitution is 
examined, as is the jurisprudence of the Irish courts towards the interpretative obligation 
found in section 2(1), and the duty placed upon organs of the State by section 3(1).  The 
article ends with a number of observations regarding the impact which the Act has had on 
the Irish courts at a more general level.  Comparisons will be drawn with the UK’s 
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On 1 January 2004 the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 
became part of the domestic law of Ireland under the European Convention on Human 
Rights Act 2003.  As of January 2014, this legislation has therefore been in force for ten 
years.  This paper seeks to analyse the Act itself and the impact which it has had on the 
Irish courts during the first decade of its operation.  The Irish legislation follows a 
familiar pattern, in that its structure contains strong similarities to that of the United 
Kingdom’s Human Rights Act 1998, and comparisons will be drawn with the UK 
legislation during the course of the discussion.  The article will begin by examining the 
use of the European Convention in the Irish courts prior to the enactment of the European 
Convention of Human Rights Act, and will proceed to analyse the reasons for the passing 
                                                 




of the Act.  The relationship between the Act and the Irish Constitution will then be 
examined, as will the jurisprudence of the Irish courts towards the interpretative 
obligation found in section 2(1) of the Act.  The approach of the courts towards the duty 
placed upon organs of the State by section 3(1) to perform their functions in a manner 
‘compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention provisions’ will also be 
discussed.  The article will end with a number of observations regarding the impact 
which the Act has had on the Irish courts at a more general level.     
 
2. The European Convention in the Irish Courts Prior to 2004. 
 
Although the European Convention on Human Rights has only been incorporated into 
domestic law in Ireland since 2003, the Irish courts were in fact adjudicating on rights 
based issues long before that date.  The Irish Constitution of 1937 is the foundational law 
of the state, and this Constitution incorporates a list of fundamental rights.  Article 40 of 
the Constitution is entitled ‘personal rights’, and includes provisions such as a right to be 
held equal before the law;1 a right to personal liberty;2 a right to express freely 
convictions and opinions; a right to assemble peaceably; and a right to form associations 
and unions.3  Article 41 contains particular protections for the family unit, for example 
under article 41.1.2 the state ‘guarantees to protect the Family in its constitution and 
authority, as the necessary basis of social order and as indispensable to the welfare of the 
Nation and the State.’  Article 42 contains a right to education and article 43 sets out a 
right to the ownership of private property.  Article 44 contains a right to freedom of 
religion.  The Irish courts are tasked with the application of these rights.   In addition, 
article 40.3.1 states that, ‘The State guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen.’  Article 
40.3.2 proceeds to assert that, ‘The State shall, in particular, by its laws protect as best it 
may from unjust attack and, in the case of injustice done, vindicate the life, person, good 
name, and property rights of every citizen.’  In 1965 it was declared in Ryan v Attorney-
General4 that the Constitution does not exhaustively enumerate the rights of Irish 
citizens, and articles 40.3.1 and 40.3.2 have since provided a ‘rich source of 
unenumerated rights in Irish constitutional law.’5  For example, in Ryan the plaintiff 
                                                 
1 Article 40.1. 
 
2 Article 40.4. 
 
3 Article 40.6.1. 
 
4 [1965] I.R. 294. 
 
5 KL Bodnick, ‘Bringing Ireland Up to Par: Incorporating the European Convention for the Protection of 




argued that articles 40.3.1 and 40.3.2 of the Constitution implicitly provided a right to 
bodily integrity, and that the Health (Fluoridation of Water Supplies) Act 1960 breached 
this right.  The High Court stated that the inclusion of the phrase ‘in particular’ in article 
40.3.2 provided for the protection of unenumerated personal rights, such as a right to 
bodily integrity and a right to privacy.6  Nevertheless, the case law of the Irish courts on 
‘unenumerated rights’ is somewhat inconsistent, and it is difficult to identify an objective 
source for such rights.7      
 
Ireland ratified the European Convention on Human Rights in February 1953, and was 
thus one of the earliest states to do so.  However, Ireland is a dualist state, therefore 
treaties do not form part of national law until they are incorporated by domestic 
legislation.  Article 29.6 of the Constitution states that ‘no international agreement shall 
be part of the domestic law of the State save as may be determined by the Oireachtas (the 
Irish Parliament).’  Indeed the provisions of the European Convention were not 
incorporated into domestic law in Ireland for over half a century after ratification.  The 
question arises therefore of what status did the Convention have in Ireland, given the 
constitutional position?    
 
In order to investigate the impact that the Convention had on the Irish courts prior to 
incorporation, the author carried out a survey of all the Irish cases on the ‘Justis’ database 
which were heard prior to 1 January 2004 and in which the European Convention was 
cited significantly.8  In this survey, eighty such cases were found, dating from between 
1960 and 2003.  As regards the specific articles of the European Convention which were 
cited in these cases, article 6 (the right to a fair trial) was referred to most frequently, 
being cited in twenty-eight cases.  Article 10 (the right to freedom of expression) was 
cited in twelve cases, and article 14 (the prohibition of discrimination) was referred to on 
six occasions.  Article 8 (the right to private and family life) received five mentions.  
Article 1 of the First Protocol (the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions) was cited 
in three cases, as was article 7 (the right to be free from retrospective punishment).  
Article 5 (the right to liberty and security) was referred to twice.  Article 2 (the right to 
life); article 3 (the right to be free from torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment); and article 12 (the right to marry and found a family) each received one 
                                                 
6 It was however held by both the High Court and the Supreme Court that the legislation in question 
violated neither the right to bodily integrity nor the right to privacy.   
 
7 For example, Bodnick, supra n 5 at 422-425. 
 
8 The Justis database includes coverage of the Irish Reports, the Irish Reports Digest, the Irish Law Reports 
Monthly Digest, the Irish Law Times Reports Digest, the Irish Jurist Reports Digest, the Irish Law Journal 
Digest and the Irish Special Reports Digest.  It therefore represents comprehensive coverage of the reported 
decisions of the Irish courts. 
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mention, as did article 2 of the First Protocol (the right to education) and article 2 of the 
Fourth Protocol (the right to freedom of movement).  There were also twenty-five cases 
which contained general references to the European Convention without specifying any 
particular articles.      
Nevertheless, despite references being made to the European Convention, it seems that in 
the vast majority of cases such references made no difference whatsoever to the actual 
outcomes of the cases in question.  As was commented in The People (Director of Public 
Prosecutions) v M.S.,  
Judges can and do refer to the Convention and the jurisprudence of the Court of 
Human Rights by way of analogy when considering issues relating to matters to 
which the Convention applies, but it is not within their jurisdiction to determine 
whether a particular statutory provision is of no effect because it is in breach of, 
or inconsistent, with the Convention.9 
Arguments based on the Convention were put forward in various cases only to be met 
with a refusal by the courts to consider such arguments, due to the fact that the 
Convention was not part of domestic law in Ireland.  As O’Connell, writing in 1995, 
remarked, ‘the orthodox view is that the ECHR does not form part of our domestic law 
and is therefore of minimal value to litigants before Irish courts.’10  Indeed, the approach 
of the courts is summarised neatly by the words of Budd J. in Brennan v Governor of 
Portlaoise Prison in which he stated that ‘it must be remembered that the Convention 
applies to Ireland but does not apply within Ireland.’11    
The Irish Supreme Court considered the question of the application of the European 
Convention in the case of In re O Laighleis,12 in which the applicant argued that his 
internment constituted a breach of the right to liberty under article 5 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and also a violation of the right to a fair trial under article 6 
of the Convention.   In this judgment Maguire C.J. stated that,  
The insuperable obstacle to importing the provisions of the Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms into the domestic law of 
Ireland…is…the terms of the Constitution of Ireland.  By Article 15.2.1 of the 
                                                 
9 [2003] 1 I.R. 606. 
 
10 D O’Connell, ‘Review of the Cases from the Republic of Ireland in Strasbourg over the Last Decade’ in 
G Quinn (ed), Irish Human Rights Yearbook (Round Hall, Dublin,1995) 1 at 2. 
 
11 [1999] 1 ILRM 190. 
 
12 [1960] I.R. 93. 
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Constitution it is provided that ‘the sole and exclusive power of making laws for 
the State is hereby vested in the Oireachtas: no other legislative authority has 
power to make laws for the State.’ Moreover, Article 29…provides at section 6 
that ‘no international agreement shall be part of the domestic law of the State save 
as may be determined by the Oireachtas.’ 
The Oireachtas has not determined that the Convention of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms is to be part of the domestic law of the State, and 
accordingly this Court cannot give effect to the Convention if it be contrary to 
domestic law or purports to grant rights or impose obligations additional to those 
of domestic law…The Court accordingly cannot accept the idea that the primacy 
of domestic legislation is displaced by the State becoming a party to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.13  
This passage was cited by the Irish courts in numerous cases thereafter.14  One such case 
was Norris v The Attorney General.15  This case is of particular note as it was eventually 
taken to the European Court of Human Rights, where a violation of article 8 was found.16  
In this case the plaintiff argued that certain provisions of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861 and of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 were inconsistent with the Irish 
Constitution.  In doing so, he claimed that since Ireland had ratified the European 
Convention, there arose a presumption that the Constitution was compatible with the 
Convention.  Therefore, in considering a question as to the consistency of statutory 
provisions with the Constitution, regard should be had as to whether the laws being 
considered were consistent with the Convention itself.  However, this argument was 
dismissed by the Supreme Court.  Higgins C.J. stated that acceptance of this submission, 
would be contrary to the provisions of the Constitution itself and would accord to 
the Government the power, by an executive act, to change both the Constitution 
and the law.  The Convention is an international agreement to which Ireland is a 
subscribing party. As such, however, it does not and cannot form part of our 
domestic law, nor affect in any way questions which arise thereunder. 
                                                 
13 At 124. 
 
14 The O Laighleis approach is also discussed in GF Whyte, ‘The Application of the European Convention 
on Human Rights before the Irish Courts’ (1982) 31 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 856-
861. 
 
15 [1984] I.R. 36. 
 
16 Norris v Ireland, app. no. 10581/83, 26 October 1988.   
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Likewise, in Croke v Smith and Others, 17  Budd J. commented that, ‘while the Court can 
look to the ECHR and the United Nations principles as being influential guidelines with 
regard to matters of public policy’, nevertheless when adjudicating on the question of 
constitutionality the court is ‘bound to approach this issue wearing blinkers as to 
Conventions setting out internationally accepted norms and standards’.  A similar 
approach was also adopted in O’B v S.18  This case related to the succession rights of an 
individual born outside marriage to the estate of her father who had died intestate.  The 
plaintiff attempted to rely on Marckx v Belgium,19 a decision of the European Court of 
Human Rights which had addressed a similar issue and in which the Court had found a 
violation of article 14 of the Convention, taken in conjunction with article 8.  This 
argument was however doomed to failure, with the Court in O’B v S stating that the 
decision in Marckx v Belgium ‘can have no bearing on the question of whether a 
provision of the (relevant national legislation) is invalid having regard to the provisions 
of the Constitution.’20  The Court proceeded to state that ‘there is no object to be served 
by this Court entering into any examination of what conflict, if any, exists between the 
decision in the Marckx case and the provisions of the (national legislation).’21  The 
claimant took her case to the European Court, with the result being a friendly settlement.    
Indeed, there were occasions in which the Irish courts refused to give effect to decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights, even when the decision in question was made 
against Ireland itself.  For example, in Airey v Ireland22 the European Court of Human 
Rights held that Ireland was in violation of articles 6 and 8 of the European Convention 
due to the state’s failure to provide the applicant with legal aid to obtain legal 
representation in seeking a judicial separation from her husband in a case involving 
domestic violence.  Following this decision, the Irish government introduced a civil legal 
aid and advice scheme in January 1980.  However, in E v E23 the defendant argued that 
this scheme was insufficient and that Ireland remained in violation of article 6.  In this 
case, the plaintiff brought an action seeking custody of her three children and also 
financial support from her husband.  The defendant applied for legal aid in order to pay 
for representation, however his application was rejected.  He subsequently argued on the 
                                                 
17 Unreported, High Court, 27 and 31 July 1995. 
 
18 [1984] I.R. 36. 
 
19 (1979-80) 2 E.H.R.R. 330. 
 
20 At 338. 
 
21 At 339. 
 
22 App. no. 6289/73, 9 October 1979. 
 
23 [1982] ILRM 497. 
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basis of Airey v Ireland that the state was in violation of the European Convention by 
failing to provide him with legal aid.  Nevertheless, the Court refused to grant legal aid in 
this instance, holding that the decision of the European Court in Airey was not binding on 
the Irish courts.  Essentially, the Court was of the view that if a citizen were dissatisfied 
with the response of the Irish government to a decision of the European Court, the 
appropriate course of action was to make an application to the European Court.  
O’Hanlon J. commented that, 
It appears to me that the defendant in the present proceedings is claiming that the 
State in setting up the Scheme of Civil Legal Aid and Advice did not go far 
enough in complying with the requirements of the European Convention, as 
interpreted by the Court of Human Rights in the Airey case, and that as a result 
the defendant in the present action is in danger of finding himself without any 
legal representation in continuing proceedings of a nature and complexity 
comparable to those which obtained in the Airey case.  As this contention is 
strongly disputed by the Attorney General, it appears to me to be a dispute which 
should properly be determined by the procedure provided for in the European 
Convention, involving a reference of the matter to the European Commission 
initially, with the possibility of a later determination by the Court of Human 
Rights.24         
Prior to the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003, plaintiffs 
seeking to rely on the European Convention put forward a variety of interesting 
arguments in their quests to do so.  For example, in Murphy v G.M.25 the appellants based 
their argument on article 29.3 of the Irish Constitution, which states that, ‘Ireland accepts 
the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct in its 
relations with other States.’  They contended that the provisions of the European 
Convention ought to be considered as being part of the ‘generally recognised principles 
of international law’ and that, as the Convention confers rights on individuals, any 
legislative measure which was in conflict with the provisions of the Convention must be 
considered repugnant to the Constitution.  The Supreme Court however was adamant 
that,  
This case concerns the application of domestic legislation to persons within the 
jurisdiction of the State. In these circumstances, it is not relevant or necessary to 
consider the application of the ‘principles of international law’ in this case or in 
                                                 
24 At 499-500. 
 
25 Michael Murphy v G.M., P.B., P.C. Ltd., G.H.; John Gilligan v Criminal Assets Bureau, Barry Galvin, 
Revenue Commissioners, Frank Lannigan, The Garda Commissioner, Ireland and the Attorney General 
[2001] 4 I.R. 113. 
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particular whether the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights 
ought to be treated as included in those ‘principles’, as Article 29.3 of the 
Constitution makes clear that these general principles, whatever their content, 
govern relations with other sovereign states at an international level.  
The Court also made the point that article 29.6 of the Constitution expressly provides that 
no international agreement would be part of the domestic law of the state except as may 
be determined by the legislature.  Essentially, ‘international treaties do not create 
obligations or rights presentable to an Irish court unless they are successfully 
incorporated into Irish domestic law.’26    
A similar argument based upon article 29.6 of the Constitution was attempted in M.F.M. 
v M.C. (Proceeds of Crime).27  In this case the applicant argued that Article 29.3 of the 
Constitution had incorporated the provisions of the European Convention into the 
Constitution.  Again this argument received short shrift from the Court, with O’Sullivan 
J. commenting that, 
It seems to me that (the Irish Constitution) provides at Article 46 an explicit 
mechanism for the amendment of the Constitution itself whether by way of 
variation, addition or appeal.  I cannot construe Article 29.3 as in any way or in 
any case supplanting this mechanism.  Not only does this sub-article not say that 
the Constitution shall be amended in accordance therewith as appropriate but if 
this were to be implied it could indeed give rise to a situation where an instrument 
solemnly adopted by the people and solemnly amended from time to time by the 
people could also from time to time be amended without such ratification. This 
seems to me to be entirely repugnant to the fundamental principles which 
underpin the Constitution...Such an interpretation would, in truth, upend the 
Constitution itself. 
Another argument which was attempted was one based on the Treaty of Rome and 
Ireland’s membership of the European Union.  Writing in 1997, Connelly stated that, 
‘Given the primacy of European Community law over domestic law, it is possible that at 
some time in the future the courts will give effect indirectly to the Convention as part of 
Community law.’28  However, the Irish courts have since dismissed this possibility.  For 
                                                 
26 Bodnick, supra n 5 at 415. 
  
27 In the matter of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996. M.F.M.v M.C., J.W., P.C. and J.C., (Proceeds of crime) 
[2001] 2 I.R. 385. 
 
28 A Connelly, ‘Ireland and the European Convention’ in B Dickson (ed), Human Rights and the European 
Convention (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1997) 185 at 197. 
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example, in Abdi v Minister for Justice29 the applicant drew the Court’s attention to the 
fact that Article 6 of the Treaty of Rome states that the fundamental rights as found in the 
European Convention on Human Rights will be respected in the member states.  He 
argued that, as it was established in article 29.4.4 of the Constitution that the laws of the 
European Union have supremacy in Irish law, this meant that Ireland was obliged to give 
effect to the European Convention on Human Rights.  However, again this argument was 
unsuccessful.  Smyth J. commented that, ‘Article 6 of the Treaty of Rome…does not 
purport to make the Convention part of the domestic law of the member states and does 
not have that effect. The language of Article 6…is directed at the European Union qua 
institution, not at individual member states.’30  Essentially, the Irish courts were 
‘emphatic that human rights protection in Ireland must be grounded in Irish law’,31 as 
opposed to treaties such as the European Convention on Human Rights, and therefore 
‘steadfastly resisted attempts by litigants directly to rely on the ECHR’.32 
Nevertheless, there were also some more positive comments from the judiciary during 
this period regarding the use of the European Convention in the Irish courts.  For 
example, in Murphy v I.R.T.C. it was commented that,  
Although the European Convention on Human Rights is not part of Irish 
municipal law, regard can be had to its provisions when considering the nature of 
a fundamental right and perhaps more particularly the reasonable limitations 
which can be placed on the exercise of that right.33 
Likewise, in Eamonn Kelly v Paul O’Neill and Conor Brady,34 a case involving the Irish 
law on contempt of court, it was stated that, ‘there is no doubt that when considering the 
balance which is required to be struck between the protection of the due administration of 
                                                 
29 Osman Bakar Abdi v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, The Interim Refugee Authority, 
Ireland and The Attorney General [2002] 4 I.R. 234. 
 
30 Similar arguments were made in Toma Adam and Others v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform, Ireland and The Attorney General; Florin Iordache v The Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform, Ireland and The Attorney General [2001] 3 I.R. 53; and in Kavanagh v The Government of 
Ireland, The Director of Public Prosecutions, The Attorney General and The Special Criminal Court 
[1996] 1 I.R. 321.  
 
31 R Murphy, ‘The Incorporation of the ECHR into Irish Domestic Law’ (2001) European Human Rights 
Law Review 640-656 at 642. 
 
32 G Hogan, ‘The Belfast Agreement and the Future Incorporation of the European Convention of Human 
Rights in the Republic of Ireland’ (1999) The Bar Review 205-211 at 205. 
 
33 [1997] 2 ILRM 467 at 476. 
 
34 [2000] 1 I.R. 354. 
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justice and freedom of expression the jurisprudence of the European Court on Human 
Rights may provide helpful guidelines.’  In Desmond v Glackin, O’Hanlon J. commented 
that, 
As Ireland has ratified the Convention and is a party to it, and as the law of 
contempt of court is based…on public policy, I think it is legitimate to assume 
that our public policy is in accord with the Convention or at least that the 
provisions of the Convention can be considered when determining issues of 
public policy.  The Convention itself is not a code of legal principles which are 
enforceable in the domestic courts, as was made clear in In re O Laighleis…, but 
this does not prevent the judgment of the European Court from having a 
persuasive effect when considering the common law regarding contempt of court 
in the light of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression contained in 
our Constitution of 1937.35 
 
In Denis O'Brien v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd., Piers Morgan, Neil Leslie and Karl 
Brophy it was commented that ‘decisions of the European Court of Human Rights on 
the…European Convention may be persuasive authority in the analysis of similar 
constitutional rights, in the same way as decisions of other constitutional courts’.36  In 
State (Healy) v Donoghue37 article 6 of the European Convention, along with U.S. case 
law, was cited in support of the principle that the state must afford the opportunity of 
being legally represented to a person who is charged with a serious criminal offence and 
who is unable to pay for legal representation.  O’Higgins C.J. commented that the 
Convention demonstrated that it was ‘generally recognised throughout Europe that, as 
one of his minimum rights, a poor person charged with a criminal offence had the right to 
have legal assistance provided for him without charge.’38  Likewise, in State (D.P.P.) v 
Walsh and Conneely it was remarked in respect of the requirements of justice in dealing 
with a charge of contempt that, ‘There is a presumption that our law in this respect is in 
conformity with the European Convention on Human Rights particularly Articles 5 and 
10(2) thereof.’39  In Re R. Ltd40 various international human rights provisions, including 
article 6 of the European Convention, were cited as evidence of the principle that justice 
                                                 
35 [1992] ILRM 490 at 513. 
 
36 [2001] 1 I.R. 1. 
 
37 [1976] I.R. 325. 
 
38 At 351. 
 
39 [1981] I.R. 412 at 440. 
 
40 [1989] I.R. 126. 
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should be administered in public.  In Finucane v McMahon, in relation to the issue of 
extradition, Walsh J. commented that the national courts should not,  
ignore the answerability of the State to the organs of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms if a particular fugitive offender is 
handed over to any other state, whether a member of the Council of Europe or 
not, where the courts are not satisfied that his treatment there would not be in 
breach of the rights protected by the Convention.41   
 
Nevertheless, overall it was abundantly clear that the courts were very reluctant to 
consider arguments based upon the European Convention prior to the enactment of the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003.  As was stated in Doyle v Garda 
Commissioner, 
The Convention may overlap with certain provisions of Irish constitutional law 
and it may be helpful to an Irish court to look at the Convention when it is 
attempting to specify certain rights guaranteed by Article 40.3 of the Constitution.  
Alternatively, the Convention may, in certain circumstances, influence Irish law 
through European Community law.  But the Convention is not part of domestic 
law and the Irish court has no power in its enforcement.42 
 
The approach of the Irish judiciary to arguments based upon the Convention prior to the 
2003 legislation can be contrasted with that of the English judiciary before the enactment 
of the Human Rights Act 1998.  Prior to the passing of the latter, many observers were of 
the opinion that the English judiciary was already ‘engaged in the infusion of the 
substance of the Convention into English law’.43  However it would seem that the 
approach of the judiciary in the Irish Republic was more akin to that of its counterpart in 
Northern Ireland.  For example, it was commented in 1996 that, ‘one can safely say that 
the views of the Northern Irish judiciary as to the applicability of the European 
Convention in Northern Irish law are restrictive.’44  Indeed it certainly appeared to be the 
case that the Northern Irish courts were not particularly receptive to arguments based on 
the European Convention during this period.45  Nevertheless, as regards the courts in the 
                                                 
41 [1990] 1 I.R. 165 at 217. 
 
42 [1998] 2 ILRM 523 at 529. 
 
43 MJ Beloff and H Mountfield, ‘Unconventional Behaviour?  Judicial uses of the European Convention in 
England and Wales’ (1996) European Human Rights Law Review 467-495 at 468. 
 
44 B Dickson, ‘The European Convention in Northern Irish Courts’ (1996) European Human Rights Law 
Review 496-510 at 510. 
 
45 See further R McQuigg, ‘A “very limited” effect or a “seismic” impact?  A study of the impact of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 on the Courts of Northern Ireland’ (2010) Public Law 550-563. 
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Republic of Ireland, it must be remembered that the judiciary is charged with the 
application of the Irish Constitution and so it may be somewhat unjust to criticise the 
judges for their reluctance to consider arguments based upon the European Convention.  
As O’Connell remarks, such criticism may only be warranted if it is ‘based on an 
objection to strict construction of the Constitution or, at least, to the form of strict 
construction used by certain Irish judges.’46    
 
3. The Incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
 
It is however interesting to note that, despite the fact that the European Convention was 
not incorporated into domestic law in Ireland until 2003, the state nevertheless 
maintained a relatively good record before the European Court of Human Rights.  As 
Hogan comments, the fact that Ireland was the last member state of the Council of 
Europe to give effect to the European Convention in its domestic law ‘only serves to give 
an entirely false picture of Ireland’s commitment to human rights protection.’47  In 
reality, Ireland was the first state to accept the right of individual petition to the European 
Court and was found to be in violation of the European Convention in only ten cases 
prior to the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, ranging in 
dates from 1979 to 2003.  As Hogan remarks, ‘At the risk of sounding complacent, this 
record cannot be regarded as other than a very good one.’48  O’Connell states that ‘the 
number of Irish cases considered by the Court of Human Rights is small and few enough 
Irish cases break new ground in terms of ECHR jurisprudence.’49  Breaches of article 6 
(the right to a fair trial) were found in five of the ten cases;50 and violations of article 8 
(the right to respect for private and family life) were found in four instances.51  The Court 
also found one violation each of article 5 (the right to liberty);52 article 10 (the right to 
                                                 
46 D O’Connell, ‘Watched Kettles Boil (Slowly): The Impact of the ECHR Act 2003’ in U Kilkelly (ed), 
ECHR and Irish Law (2nd ed., Jordan Publishing Limited, Bristol, 2009) 1 at 5. 
 
47 G Hogan, ‘Ireland: The European Convention of Human Rights Act 2003’ (2006) 12 European Public 
Law 331-343 at 332. 
  
48 Hogan, supra n 32 at 205. 
 
49 O’Connell, supra n 46 at 4. 
 
50 Airey v Ireland, app. no. 6289/73, 9 October 1979; Keegan v Ireland app. no. 16969/90, 26 May 1994; 
Quinn v Ireland app. no. 26887/97, 21 December 2000; Heaney and McGuinness v Ireland app. no. 
34720/97, 21 December 2000; Doran v Ireland app. no. 50389/99, 31 July 2003.    
 
51 Airey v Ireland; Keegan v Ireland; Johnston and Others v Ireland app. no. 9697/82, 18 December 1986; 
Norris v Ireland, app. no. 10581/83, 26 October 1988.   
 
52 D.G. v Ireland app. no. 39474/98, 16 May 2002. 
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freedom of expression);53 article 13 (the right to an effective remedy);54 and article 14 
(the right to non-discrimination) taken in conjunction with article 1 of the First Protocol 
(the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions).55  By contrast, the UK was found to be 
in violation of the Convention in 52 cases before the European Court prior to the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998.  It can be seen therefore that the decision to 
incorporate the European Convention into domestic law in Ireland cannot be attributed to 
a poor record before the European Court of Human Rights.   
 
In reality, the incorporation of the Convention was largely due to commitments made by 
the Irish government as part of the Good Friday Agreement of 1998.  In addition to 
establishing the arrangements for the governance of Northern Ireland, this document also 
contained commitments by both the British and Irish governments on a number of 
matters, including in the area of human rights protection.  As Anthony comments, the 
Agreement ‘remains as an achievement that challenges long-settled norms of Irish and 
UK constitutional law’.56  As part of the commitments made in the Agreement, the Irish 
government stated that it would,  
take steps to further strengthen the protection of human rights in its jurisdiction.  
The Government will…bring forward measures to strengthen and underpin the 
constitutional protection of human rights.  These proposals will draw on the 
European Convention on Human Rights and other international legal instruments 
in the field of human rights and the question of the incorporation of the ECHR 
will be examined in this context.  The measures brought forward would ensure at 
least an equivalent level of protection of human rights as will pertain in Northern 
Ireland.57     
 
As O’Connell et. al. comment, ‘In substantive legal terms, the incorporation of the ECHR 
into Irish law was probably the most important human rights development to emerge in 
the Republic from the signing of the Belfast / Good Friday Agreement in 1998.’58  It 
should however be noted that the commitment of the Irish government was only to 
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‘examine’ the issue of incorporation of the European Convention – it did not in reality go 
so far as to mandate the actual incorporation of the Convention.  Nevertheless, following 
the passing of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK, Ireland found itself in the 
‘embarrassing position’59 of being the last remaining state in the Council of Europe not to 
have incorporated the Convention into national law.  Given this situation and the 
requirement under the Agreement to examine the issue further, at this stage incorporation 
appeared to take on almost an air of inevitability.  In addition, in the context of the cross-
border bodies and the North-South Ministerial Council which were to be set up in the 
wake of the Good Friday Agreement, it was important to have ‘a neutral yardstick of 
fundamental rights protection.’60  As Hogan remarks, ‘Irrespective of the legal virtues of 
the Constitution as compared with the ECHR, the latter provides a politically neutral 
template for sensitive cross-border dealings which the former could never hope to 
attain.’61         
 
Prior to the signing of the Good Friday Agreement, the incorporation of the European 
Convention into domestic law had never been a major issue of concern to the main 
political parties, although Fianna Fail had called for incorporation in 1975.  Likewise, this 
was not an issue on which many non-governmental organisations tended to campaign.62  
Writing in 1995, O’Connell remarked that, ‘Debates on crucial issues such as 
incorporation of the Convention…have been lamentably absent in (Ireland)’.63  Indeed, 
there was a view in some quarters that incorporation would encroach upon Ireland’s 
national sovereignty.  It was also felt that direct legislative incorporation would mean that 
the margin of appreciation afforded to states as regards interpretation of the Convention 
provisions would move from the legislature to the judiciary, as it would be judges who 
would decide in any given case whether the law or state action in question complied with 
the provisions of the Convention. 64  In addition, as Hogan comments, the fact that Ireland 
was the last state within the Council of Europe to incorporate the provisions of the 
Convention into domestic law,  
stemmed largely from the dualist character of the State along with the (admittedly 
slightly complacent) assumption that the existence of corresponding guarantees in 
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the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution of Ireland rendered such 
incorporation unnecessary and superfluous.65 
 
It is certainly true that the Irish Constitution contains ‘an impressive array of individual 
rights’, particularly given the fact that this document was drafted well in advance of the 
formulation of key human rights instruments such as the Universal Declaration on 
Human Rights of 1948 and the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950.66  
Indeed the Irish government was of the opinion that incorporation of the European 
Convention was unnecessary as the Constitution provided superior rights protection, and 
it would be impractical to have two instruments regarding the protection of rights.67  For 
example, in October 1993 the then Minister for Justice, Maire Geoghegan-Quinn TD 
stated that, ‘It would be difficult to incorporate into our laws, whether by means of a 
constitutional amendment or legislation, new provisions which duplicate many of those 
already in the Constitution.’68  In some respects, it is certainly true to say that such 
arguments were not entirely without substance.  There is indeed ‘a striking degree of 
overlap between the respective guarantees (as judicially interpreted) contained in the 
Constitution and the Convention.’69  In addition, guarantees relating to personal liberty, 
non-discrimination on the grounds of religious belief and the separation of powers are all 
more extensive under the Irish Constitution than under the European Convention.70   
 
Indeed, even by 1998 the Irish government did not seem particularly enthusiastic as 
regards the incorporation of the Convention rights into national law.  In February 1998 
David Andrews TD, the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, stated that, 
With regard to the implementation in Ireland of the provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, it has been the view of successive Irish 
Governments that rights guaranteed under the Constitution, relevant legislation 
and common law rights in Ireland, fully correspond to, and in places exceed those 
available through the Convention.  These rights are, of course, justiciable in our 
domestic courts.  I should point out that while we are committed to equivalence 
between the human rights regimes North and South, this does not mean that 
precisely identical mechanisms have to be in place in the two jurisdictions.  
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However, we are prepared to examine actively proposals for incorporation if it 
appears that this would be necessary to ensure the equivalence we seek between 
human rights regimes in the North and the South.  In this context, the Government 
has decided to ask the relevant Departments to look again at the various complex 
legal and practical issues, including those relating to the Constitution that would 
be involved in the incorporation of the European Convention into domestic 
legislation.’71        
 
Prior to the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, various 
methods of proceeding were put forward.  In 1996 a limited form of incorporation of the 
Convention was recommended by the Constitution Review Group, whereby the 
Convention and other international human rights instruments would be used as a source 
of supplementary rights protection in situations in which the right in question was not 
expressly protected by the Constitution; the standard of protection of the right was 
superior to that guaranteed by the Constitution; or the wording of a clause of the 
Constitution protecting the right might be improved.72  However, this recommendation 
was not pursued.  As Hogan commented in 1999, one difficulty with such an approach 
would be that it would necessitate a very careful analysis of each of the individual rights 
provisions contained in the Constitution in order to ascertain whether these criteria were 
fulfilled.73  A potential course of action which was rejected by the Constitution Review 
Group was simply to replace the existing rights protections contained in Articles 40-44 of 
the Constitution with the European Convention.  However, the Review Group stated that 
such an approach would result in ‘too great a change in our legal system and one which 
would not be warranted by any existing flaws in (Articles 40-44).  It would mean 
jettisoning almost sixty years of well established and sophisticated case law.’74  Also, as 
commented above, in some respects the guarantees contained in the Constitution are 
more extensive than those found in the European Convention, therefore a straightforward 
replacement of the Constitutional provisions with those contained in the Convention 
could certainly have the potential to be disadvantageous.75  
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Another possible course of action was that of following the example of the UK and 
incorporating the Convention by an ordinary Act of Parliament.  Writing in 1999, Hogan 
remarked that,  
This procedure makes little sense in the context of a written Constitution…The 
courts cannot invalidate one ordinary law by reference to another ordinary law (as 
an ordinary law incorporating the ECHR would be): they can only do so by 
reference to the Constitution itself.  Besides, there would be great uncertainty and 
the overlapping of guarantees in such areas as free speech, personal liberty, (and) 
property rights between the ordinary law incorporating the ECHR and the 
Constitution itself.76 
Nevertheless, this was the method of incorporation which was eventually chosen.  The 
European Convention on Human Rights Bill was introduced in April 2001, and was 
eventually enacted into law on 31 December 2003.  The legislation was described by one 
commentator as ‘an Irish solution to what is perceived to be an Irish problem, i.e. how to 
incorporate the ECHR in a way that will avoid conflict with Irish constitutional law and 
jurisprudence.’77  When the Bill was introduced it was greeted with disappointment by 
those who had supported incorporation, such as the Irish Human Rights Commission.78  
O’Connell et. al. comment that, 
the debate on incorporation of the ECHR into Irish law was characterized by 
strong expressions of scepticism about the likelihood of added-value in terms of 
impact.  On the one hand, proponents of the limited mode of incorporation took 
the view that the ECHR had little to add – by way of substantive human rights 
protections – to the level of such rights protection guaranteed by the 1937 Irish 
Constitution.  Opponents saw this as something of a self-fulfilling prophecy and 
argued that a stronger model of incorporation would create a context in which the 
real potential of the Convention to add value to substantive rights protection could 
be more fully explored.79    
Writing in 2001, Murphy remarked that, ‘Given the constitutional issues and the 
unresolved tensions between the domestic and international legal order, it came as no 
surprise that the proposed European Convention on Human Rights Bill 2001, provides for 
a minimalist form of incorporation.’80 
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4. The European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. 
 
As with the UK’s Human Rights Act, one of the fundamental features of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act consists of an interpretative obligation which is placed 
upon national courts.  Section 2(1) of the 2003 Act states that, ‘In interpreting and 
applying any statutory provision or rule of law, a court shall, in so far as is possible, 
subject to the rules of law relating to such interpretation and application, do so in a 
manner compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention provisions.’  This 
provision is similar to section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act, which states that, ‘So far as 
it is possible to do so, primary legislation and subordinate legislation must be read and 
given effect in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights.’  The decision to 
follow the UK’s approach in this respect did not however meet with universal support.  
For example, Murphy commented that the adoption of an interpretative model was ‘both 
unfortunate and unnecessary’, as the concept of parliamentary sovereignty which applies 
in the UK is not applicable in Ireland.81  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the 
interpretative obligation imposed by the Irish legislation does differ from its UK 
counterpart in that it applies not only to primary and subordinate legislation but also to 
any rule of law, thereby encompassing the common law. 
 
Section 5(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights Act states that,  
In any proceedings, the High Court, or the Supreme Court when exercising its 
appellate jurisdiction, may, having regard to the provisions of section 2, on 
application to it in that benefit by a party, or of its own motion, and where no 
other legal remedy is adequate and available, make a declaration (referred to in 
this Act as “a declaration of incompatibility”) that a statutory provision or rule of 
law is incompatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention provisions. 
Section 5(2)(a) proceeds to state that, ‘A declaration of incompatibility shall not affect 
the validity, continuing operation or enforcement of the statutory provision or rule of law 
in respect of which it is made.’  In this respect, a declaration of incompatibility under the 
2003 Act differs substantially from a declaration of unconstitutionality under Article 34 
of the Irish Constitution.  Unlike a declaration of incompatibility, a declaration of 
unconstitutionality has the effect of invalidating the legislation in question.  Under 
section 5(4) of the 2003 Act, any court order containing a declaration of incompatibility 
must be laid before each House of the Oireachtas within the next twenty-one days on 
which that House has sat following the making of the order.  An ex gratia payment of 
compensation may be made by the government to the injured party upon application by 
that party to the Attorney General.  An adviser may be appointed to advise the 
government on the appropriate level of compensation to be awarded and that adviser 
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must take into account the principles and practice applied by the European Court of 
Human Rights as regards awarding just satisfaction under article 41 of the European 
Convention.  Clearly the procedure of making a declaration of incompatibility under the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act is very similar to that of making a 
declaration of incompatibility under section 4 of the Human Rights Act.  There is 
however no provision in the 2003 Act for a ‘fast track’ method of amending legislation 
which has been the subject of a declaration of incompatibility, such as is found in section 
10 of the Human Rights Act.  
 
Section 3(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights Act provides that, ‘Subject to 
any statutory provision (other than this Act) or rule of law, every organ of the State shall 
perform its functions in a manner compatible with the State’s obligations under the 
Convention provisions.’  Section 3(1) is similar to section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act, 
which states that, ‘It is unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is 
incompatible with a Convention right.’  The additional wording in section 3(1) of the 
2003 Act stating that this duty is ‘subject to any statutory provision…or rule of law’ is 
somewhat interesting.  As O’Connell et. al. point out, if an organ of the state attempted to 
defend its actions on the grounds that another statutory provision or rule of law required 
it to act in a manner that were not compatible with the Convention right, it would ‘in 
effect, be pleading a kamikaze defence.’82  Such a defence would essentially amount to 
an admission of incompatibility, thereby leaving the state open to being found in 
violation of the Convention by the European Court of Human Rights.83  Section 3(2) of 
the 2003 Act provides that, ‘A person who has suffered injury, loss or damage as a result 
of a contravention of subsection (1), may, if no other remedy in damages is available, 
institute proceedings to recover damages in respect of the contravention…and the Court 
may award to the person such damages (if any) as it considers appropriate.’  
 
Under section 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, the term ‘organ of 
the State’ includes ‘a tribunal or any other body (other than the President or the 
Oireachtas…or a court) which is established by law or through which any of the 
legislative, executive or judicial powers of the State are exercised.’  The exclusion of 
courts from the duty to act compatibly with the state’s obligations under the Convention 
provisions is somewhat striking, as it constitutes a departure from the legislative scheme 
contained in the Human Rights Act.  Section 6(3) of the UK legislation states that the 
term ‘public authority’ includes a court or tribunal, which has the effect of placing a duty 
on the courts to act in a manner that is compatible with the Convention rights.   
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By excluding courts entirely from the definition of ‘organ of the State’, the Irish 
legislature has afforded a complete exemption to the courts from the section 3(1) duty to 
act compatibly with the Convention provisions.  This approach certainly has the merit of 
simplicity.  However, whether this was the correct approach to adopt is debatable.  As 
O’Connell comments, ‘The exclusion of the courts from the definition of “organs of the 
State” was a source of some considerable controversy in parliamentary and extra-
parliamentary debates on incorporation’.84  For example, Murphy is of the view that 
excluding the courts from the definition of ‘organ of the state’ is a ‘crucial omission’ and 
is ‘in stark contrast with the broad definition of “public authority” under section 6 of the 
(Human Rights Act).’85  In the UK, the courts have used section 6 to contribute to the 
development of the concept of ‘horizontal effect.’  The courts, as public authorities, are 
under a duty to act compatibly with the Convention rights, and they interpret this duty as 
meaning that they can apply these rights in cases involving only private parties.  
However, the terms of the European Convention on Human Rights Act largely prevent 
the Irish courts from adopting such a course of action.  Although a degree of horizontal 
effect can still arise through the use of the section 2(1) interpretative obligation, 
nevertheless the decision to exclude courts from the definition of ‘organ of the State’ has 
the effect of substantially curtailing the development of a concept of horizontal effect.       
 
Section 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights Act states that courts must ‘take 
due account’ of the principles laid down by the declarations, decisions, advisory opinions 
and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights when interpreting and applying 
the Convention provisions.  This duty is similar to the obligation placed on the UK courts 
by section 2(1) of the Human Rights Act to take into account the judgments of the 
European Court of Human Rights.  It is notable that there are no provisions in the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act which relate to the pre-enactment scrutiny of 
legislation, such as those found in section 19 of the Human Rights Act. 
 
5. The Relationship Between the European Convention on Human Rights Act and 
the Constitution. 
 
One of the first questions to which the passing of the European Convention on Human 
Rights Act gave rise was what would be the relationship between this legislation and the 
Irish Constitution?  For example, Murphy predicted that, ‘Irish judges may still prefer to 
base their human rights rulings on the more familiar jurisprudence of Irish constitutional 
law, and pay lip service to that of the ECHR and elsewhere.’86  The long title of the Act 
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itself states that it is ‘An Act to enable further effect to be given, subject to the 
Constitution, to certain provisions of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms…and certain protocols thereto’.  The fact that the Act was to 
be regarded as inferior to the Constitution was never thus in any doubt, and the Irish 
judiciary has clearly stated that the Constitution retains supremacy over the Convention 
provisions.  For example, in G.T. v K.A.O. McKechnie J. commented that the 2003 Act 
‘gave effect to the Convention in Irish law but did so through the model of indirect or 
interpretative incorporation at a sub-constitutional level’.87  Similarly, in Mahon v Keena 
Fennelly J. emphasised that in a case where a conflict arose between the Convention 
provisions and the Constitution, it would be the Constitution which should prevail.88  In 
J.McB. v L.E. it was commented that, 
It is true…that the courts are under a duty to interpret the law in a manner 
compatible with the State's obligations under the European Convention on Human 
Rights insofar as is possible.  But it follows that a concept or right (recognised 
elsewhere), but not compatible with the terms of the Constitution must pro tanto 
be subordinated to the provisions of the Constitution as interpreted in national 
law.89 
 
The relationship between the Constitution and the Convention provisions was also 
discussed in Edward Carmody v The Minister for Justice,90 in which it was stated that if 
an applicant sought a declaration of incompatibility under section 5(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act and also a declaration of unconstitutionality, the latter 
issue should be decided first.  As Murray C.J. commented,  
the court is satisfied that when a party makes a claim that an Act or any of its 
provisions is invalid for being repugnant to the Constitution and at the same time 
makes an application for a declaration of incompatibility of such Act or some of 
its provisions with the State’s obligations under the Convention, the issue of 
constitutionality must first be decided.91   
It appears that this principle arises from the fact that under section 5(1) of the Act, a 
declaration of incompatibility may only be granted ‘where no other legal remedy is 
adequate or available’.  Indeed, in Caroline McCann v Monaghan District Judge92 it was 
stated that, where a declaration of unconstitutionality was made, it was not necessary or 
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appropriate to consider whether a declaration of incompatibility with the European 
Convention ought also to be made.  Similarly, in Law Society v Competition Authority93 
the constitutional issue was addressed first, while the alternative claim based on 
European Convention provisions was regarded as superfluous as the Court had already 
granted an order of certiorari on the basis of the Constitution.  As O’Connell comments, 
as the form of incorporation chosen is explicitly sub-constitutional it follows that 
the rule of practice whereby constitutional issues are reached last gives way to the 
alternative sequential consideration indicated in the 2003 Act in cases where 
declarations of incompatibility are sought.94  
 
Brady remarks that, ‘For various reasons, perhaps not least a sense of pride in the 
national Constitution, many cases seem to be disposed of by a finding of 
unconstitutionality rather than a declaration of incompatibility.’95 Indeed, to date only 
three declarations of incompatibility have been made.  These were granted in the cases of 
Foy v An t-Ard Chláraitheoir & Ors,96 Donegan v Dublin City Council & Others97 and 
Dublin City Council v Liam Gallagher.98  Nevertheless, as Brady comments, ‘the 
Convention has had a significant indirect impact on Irish law as a sort of brooding 
presence in the courtroom whenever the constitutionality of a provision is being judicially 
considered.’99   
  
6. The Interpretative Obligation. 
 
Under section 2(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, ‘In interpreting 
and applying any statutory provision or rule of law, a court shall, in so far as is possible, 
subject to the rules of law relating to such interpretation and application, do so in a 
manner compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention provisions.’  As 
previously mentioned, although this provision seems somewhat similar to section 3(1) of 
the UK’s Human Rights Act, the inclusion of the phrase ‘subject to the rules of law 
relating to such interpretation and application’ means that the Irish provision is 
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significantly narrower than its UK equivalent.  As Brady argues, ‘there is a marked 
divergence between the two jurisdictions which is grounded in a significant difference of 
wording between what are otherwise two very similar statutory regimes for the 
incorporation of Convention rights into domestic law.’100       
 
In approaching section 2(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, the 
Supreme Court in  J.McD v P.L. and B.M. made it clear that section 2,  
obviously is not a basis for founding an autonomous claim based on a breach of a 
particular section of the Act…In exercising its jurisdiction pursuant to s. 2 a court 
must identify the statutory provisions or rule of law which it is interpreting or 
applying. Even then it is subject to any rule of law relating to interpretation and 
application.101 
In this case Murray C.J. considered the relationship between the interpretative obligation 
under section 2(1) of the Act and the Constitutional status of the Oireachtas.  He referred 
to the fact that under article 15.2 of the Constitution, ‘the sole and exclusive power of 
making laws for the State’ is vested in the Oireachtas.  Murray C.J. commented that due 
to the evolving nature of the Convention rights, as interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights, 
the Oireachtas itself will not always be in a position to perceive or even 
contemplate, by recourse to any objective considerations, the meaning, by 
reference to the Convention, which may subsequently be given to the provision of 
an Act which it is passing (and which it might have passed in altogether different 
terms if it could have). This raises questions as to how the intent of the Oireachtas 
by reference to the text of a statute which it has adopted in accordance with the 
Constitution is to be determined and the relevance of that intent to its 
interpretation…Perhaps the answers to such questions lie in whole or in part in 
the proviso in s. 2, by which the requirement to interpret a statute in a manner 
compatible with the Convention is ‘subject to the rules of law relating to such 
interpretation and application’.102 
It was clear from these comments that the intention of the Oireachtas should remain 
paramount in cases in which the section 2(1) interpretative obligation is engaged, due to 
the exclusive power of law making granted to the Oireachtas under the Constitution.  
Nevertheless, to date the Irish Supreme Court has not considered section 2(1) of the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act in any great detail.  There is thus no 
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equivalent case to that of Ghaidan v Godin Mendoza,103 in which the House of Lords 
gave detailed consideration to the ramifications of section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act.  
Nevertheless, section 2(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights Act has been 
discussed in detail in certain High Court decisions.       
 
The first of these cases was Foy v An t-Ard Chláraitheoir & Ors.104  The main issue in 
this case was whether certain provisions of the Civil Registration Act 2004 could be 
interpreted in such a manner as to be compatible with the Convention provisions.  The 
case ultimately resulted in the issuing of the first declaration of incompatibility under the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act.  In its discussion of the interpretative 
obligation under the Act, the Court stated that, 
it must be noted that s.2 of the Act of 2003 is not free from doubt, in particular 
where it uses the expression ‘…in so far as possible…’.  Less wide ranging 
phrases such as in so far as is ‘reasonable’ or ‘practicable’ or some other such 
similar wording is not used.  Therefore…the Oireachtas intended the courts to go 
much further than simply applying traditional criteria, such as e.g., the purposeful 
rule or giving ambiguous words a meaning which accords with Convention rights; 
something like the double construction test.  This type of restrictive approach was 
rejected by the House of Lords in R v A [2001] 3 All ER 1 when dealing with the 
identical phrase contained in s.3 of the Human Rights Act 1998… 
Within these restrictions…it is safe to say that the section cannot extend to 
producing a meaning which is fundamentally at variance with a key or core 
feature of the statutory provision or rule of law in question.  It cannot be applied 
contra legem nor can it permit the destruction of a scheme or its replacement with 
a remodeled one.  In addition, a given legal position may be so well established 
that it becomes virtually immutable in the landscape.  It seems…that to apply the 
section in any of these circumstances, which are but examples, would be to breach 
the threshold, even one set as expansively as this one is.  When the court finds 
itself so restricted the only remedy is a declaration of incompatibility.105  
Overall, the High Court in Foy appeared to adopt an expansive approach to section 2(1), 
much like that of the House of Lords in Ghaidan v Godin Mendoza to section 3(1) of the 
Human Rights Act.106  An appeal was initially lodged against the decision of the High 
Court, however the appeal was then dropped in 2010. 
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Another High Court decision has nevertheless since adopted a more restrictive approach 
to the duty placed upon the courts by section 2(1) of the European Court of Human 
Rights Act.  In Dublin City Council v Liam Gallagher,107 the legislative provision in 
question was section 62 of the Housing Act 1966.  This section had already been the 
subject of a declaration of incompatibility in Donegan v Dublin City Council & Others.108  
In Dublin City Council v Liam Gallagher a declaration of incompatibility was again 
issued in respect of this provision.  In relation to section 2(1) the Court stated that, 
it seems clear…that the starting point in attempting to construe this section in a 
Convention compatible way is to first determine the correct construction without 
regard to the Convention and having done that to then see whether it is possible to 
impose or intertwine a different meaning where that is necessary to avoid 
incompatibility with the Convention.  Where it is not possible to achieve this 
without breaching the rules of law relating to interpretation, and where there is an 
evident breach of a Convention right resulting from what is a correct 
interpretation of the law in question, the proper solution to that problem is a 
declaration of incompatibility under s.5 of the Act of 2003.     
The Court emphasised ‘the significant difference’ between section 2(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act and section 3(1) of the UK’s Human Rights Act.  It 
stated that the difference lies ‘in the inclusion in s.2 of the Act of 2003 of the phrase 
“subject to the rules of law relating to such interpretation”.  A similar provision is not 
included in s.3(1) of the UK Act.’ 
 
Brady comments that,  
The consequences of this difference are important, because it means that in 
(Ireland) a Court, when attempting to construe a law in a Convention compatible 
way, is still bound by the rules of law which heretofore have governed such 
interpretation, whereas in the U.K. no such restriction is imposed by Parliament.  
The range of manoeuvre available to a U.K. court…is not available to an Irish 
Court.109   
It seems that a court using section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act can impose a meaning 
which is compatible with the Convention rights unless that meaning clearly conflicts with 
the express terms of the legislation in question.  However, it appears that a court utilising 
section 2(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights Act must still adhere to 
existing rules of statutory interpretation whereby effect should be given to the will of 
Parliament, as derived from the ordinary meaning of the language in the statute 
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concerned.110  According to de Londras and Kelly, the approach of the High Court in 
Gallagher is problematic.  They state that ‘if an Irish court begins by setting out the 
“correct” construction of a statute, arguably any alternative construction will be contrary 
to the rules of law relating to such interpretation and application of s.2’.111  However, 
Brady argues that to ‘determine the correct construction’ as referred to in Gallagher 
should be to ‘determine what is the boundary of the permissible’, as opposed to ‘find the 
solely permissible interpretation.’  By this understanding of the Gallagher approach, in 
situations in which there are two or more interpretations which could reasonably be 
viewed as falling within the legislature’s intention, the courts must apply an interpretation 
which is compatible with the Convention rights over one which is not compatible.112      
 
7. The Duty on Organs of the State. 
   
Section 3(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights Act places a duty on organs 
of the state to perform their functions in a manner ‘compatible with the State’s 
obligations under the Convention provisions.’  As O’Connell states, ‘it would be 
incorrect to say that the Convention in any sense displaced the Constitution or other 
sources of Irish law as the main basis upon which actions in judicial review are 
maintained.’113  Nevertheless, as O’Donnell et. al. comment, ‘There is little doubt that 
recourse to Convention-based argument is now a routine practice in judicial review’.114  
However, one of the key questions which has arisen for the Irish courts is what is the 
standard of judicial review to be applied in assessing compliance with human rights 
obligations? 
In Irish law the usual test to be applied in a judicial review of an administrative decision 
is what is commonly referred to as ‘the O'Keeffe test’, due to the fact that it is derived 
from the principles enunciated by Finlay C.J. in his judgment in the Supreme Court in 
O’Keeffe v An Bord Pleanala.115  Essentially the test is that a decision ought not to be 
quashed on judicial review unless the decision maker has acted irrationally in the sense 
that the decision making authority had before it no material which would support its 
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decision.  In his judgment Finlay C.J. referred to the case of The State (Keegan) v 
Stardust Compensation Tribunal,116  in which Henchy J. discussed when a court could 
intervene to quash a decision on grounds of ‘unreasonableness or irrationality’.  
Essentially, in order to do so, the decision must have been fundamentally at variance with 
reason and common sense.  This approach therefore carries strong similarities to the 
concept of Wednesbury unreasonableness in UK law.117  However, would the O’Keeffe 
test be applied in judicial review as regards section 3(1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights Act or would a lower standard be used in such cases? 
In L.C. v The Minister for Justice118 it was commented that in cases involving rights, ‘one 
should not depart from the…principles as applied by the Supreme Court, inter alia, in 
 O’Keeffe v An Bord Pleanala’.  However, in M.A v The Minister for Justice,119 the High 
Court advocated a different approach.  In this case it was stated that, ‘As far as the 
appropriate test is concerned for cases involving an issue of Convention rights…a new 
approach is necessary following the passing into law of the European Convention on 
Human Rights Act 2003.’120  Essentially the Court was concerned that confinement of the 
availability of judicial review to the terms of the O’Keeffe test would not be sufficient to 
provide an effective remedy for the purposes of article 13 of the Convention.  By 
contrast, in B.J.N. v The Minister for Justice McCarthy J. commented in the High Court 
that he could not accept that the application of the test laid down in O’Keeffe would be 
insufficient to afford an effective remedy.  He stated that he was ‘clearly bound’ by the 
O’Keeffe principles, and that these principles did not ‘contemplate any exceptional or 
special test’.121   
However, this issue was finally resolved by the Supreme Court in its 2010 judgment in 
Meadows v The Minister for Justice.122  In this case it was held that the correct test to be 
applied in reviewing the rationality of an administrative decision which affects 
constitutional or fundamental rights is as stated in O'Keeffe.  The Court was of the view 
that, when construed broadly, this test was sufficiently general and flexible to allow it to 
be applied in such a manner as to protect fundamental rights.  The Court also stated that 
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the principle of proportionality was inherent in any analysis of the reasonableness of a 
decision and had a legitimate and proper function in examining whether an administrative 
decision was valid in accordance with the principles of O’Keeffe.  This approach 
contrasts therefore with that of the UK courts under section 6 of the Human Rights Act, 
whereby the courts apply a somewhat more rigorous form of review than that of 
traditional Wednesbury unreasonableness.123  
8. A Degree of Horizontal Effect? 
As previously mentioned, the courts have been explicitly excluded from the definition of 
‘organs of the State’ found in section 1(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
Act and so are not subject to the section 3(1) duty of performing their functions in a 
manner ‘compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention provisions.’  This 
means that the scope for the creation of a concept of ‘horizontal effect’, such as has been 
developed by the UK courts under the Human Rights Act, is heavily curtailed.  As Canny 
and Lowry remark, this is, ‘One of the primary distinctions between the two regimes’.124  
Indeed, Michael McDowell TD, the then Minister for Justice, stated in the Dail 
(parliamentary) debates on the Act that the Convention rights were not intended to have 
the horizontal application which is afforded to the rights contained in the Irish 
Constitution.125  Canny and Lowry view this as ‘one of the most important policy 
decisions taken in the chosen method of incorporation of the Convention.’126  Writing in 
2003, O’Cinneide commented that the exemption of the courts from the definition of 
‘organs of the State’ was ‘unfortunate’.  He proceeded to state that,  
The presence of a duty upon the courts to give effect to rights norms has been 
very influential in Germany, South Africa and the UK, and this may ensure that 
the Irish courts will continue to adopt a less than proactive approach to 
developing private law in line with fundamental rights.  This would be a 
remarkable, unfortunate and retrogressive approach to incorporation.127 
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Nevertheless, a certain degree of horizontal effect may still be derived from the 
interpretative obligation contained in section 2(1) of the Act.  As Collins and O’Reilly 
comment,  
in circumstances where the State has adopted legislation imposing obligations on 
private parties that have the effect of securing the protection of a Convention 
right…it is difficult to see why the interpretative obligation should not be invoked 
in proceedings between private parties concerning its application and 
interpretation.128 
Indeed, there does seem to be one area in which the courts are applying Convention 
rights, specifically the article 6 right to a fair trial, to cases involving only private 
individuals.  This is the issue of delay in judicial proceedings.  This was one of the first 
areas in relation to which the European Convention on Human Rights Act had a 
significant impact.  Indeed, writing in 2006, almost three years after the coming into 
force of the Act, Hogan stated that, ‘Perhaps the only real tangible effect thus far has 
been that the ECHR delay case-law has prompted the courts to take a more interventionist 
line so far as litigant delay is concerned’.129  In 2009 Brown similarly commented that, 
‘since the ECHR Act came into force, reliance is increasingly being placed on the 
(European Court of Human Rights’s) “delay” jurisprudence in the domestic courts where 
the potential of Article 6 as an additional weapon in delay cases has not gone 
unnoticed.’130   She also stated that such cases, 
demonstrate that the post-incorporation ECHR does, in reality, have a certain de 
facto horizontal effect: in delaying legal proceedings, a private party can find 
themselves punished by the courts for violating the other side’s right to a speedy 
determination of the legal controversy at issue.131 
The jurisprudence on this matter originated in the Supreme Court case of Gilroy v 
Flynn132 in which Hardiman J. commented that  
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following such cases as McMullen v. Ireland…and the European Convention on 
Human Rights Act 2003 the courts, quite independently of the action or inaction 
of the parties, have an obligation to ensure that rights and liabilities, civil or 
criminal, are determined within a reasonable time. 
In McMullen v Ireland,133 the European Court of Human Rights found a violation of 
article 6(1) of the European Convention due to legal proceedings not having been dealt 
with within a reasonable time.  However, the question of how precisely the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act contributes to the placing of such an obligation on the 
courts is somewhat unclear, given the fact that the courts are not subject to the section 
3(1) duty of performing their functions in a manner ‘compatible with the State’s 
obligations under the Convention provisions.’ Essentially, it is difficult to reconcile the 
obligation referred to in Gilroy v Flynn with the usual approach of the Irish courts 
whereby, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights does not produce free standing 
rights in national law’.134  Nevertheless the Gilroy v Flynn approach has been followed in 
a number of cases.  For example, in Allergan Pharmaceuticals (Ireland) Ltd v Noel 
Deane Roofing and Cladding Limited, M.J. Conroy and Sons Limited, and Liam Mullaly 
and Aiden Leonard,135 a case involving only private parties, it was stated that ‘courts now 
under the European Convention have their own obligation to ensure civil actions are 
heard within a reasonable time’.136  The Gilroy v Flynn approach was also cited with 
approval by the Supreme Court in Gerald J.P. Stephens v Paul Flynn Limited.137  
The issue of delay was considered again by the Supreme Court in Desmond v M.G.N. 
Ltd.138  In this case Geoghegan J. adopted a different approach, stating that in her view 
the comments of Hardiman J. in Gilroy v Flynn on this issue were obiter dicta only.  
Geoghegan J. was of the opinion that it was neither necessary nor desirable that the 
established principles relating to delay in Irish law should change or be revisited in light 
of the European Convention on Human Rights.  However in a dissenting judgment, 
Kearns J. stated that ‘the legal landscape with regard to delay has undoubtedly altered 
following the coming into operation of the European Convention on Human Rights Act 
2003. Section 4 of that Act requires that judicial notice be taken of the Convention 
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provisions.’139   It is certainly the case that under section 4 the courts must ‘take due 
account’ of the principles laid down by the judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights when interpreting and applying the Convention provisions.  Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to ascertain how the Convention provisions arise for discussion in the first place, 
given the fact that the courts are exempt from the section 3(1) duty of performing their 
functions in a manner ‘compatible with the State’s obligations under the Convention 
provisions.’ 
It is submitted that the most coherent manner in which to address the issue of delay can 
be found in another judgment of Geoghegan J.  In McFarlane v Director of Public 
Prosecutions,140 she outlined a number of potential approaches to the question of how the 
courts should address the issue of delay in the context of human rights.  One of the 
possibilities was that account should only be taken of delay caused within the office of 
the Director of Public Prosecutions or the police, but not within the courts.  Geoghegan J. 
proceeded to comment that,  
It must be remembered in this connection that unlike in the case of the United 
Kingdom the courts are excluded from the definition of ‘organ of the State’ in the 
European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003.  If the courts have been 
expressly excluded from that Act, as they have been, it might seem wrong on one 
view to introduce them by a back door.141 
This certainly appears to represent the most logical manner in which to address the issue 
of delay.  The Director of Public Prosecutions and the police are included in the 
definition of ‘organs of the State’ for the purposes of section 3(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights Act.  An inordinate delay caused by either of these bodies 
could therefore give rise to a breach of the section 3(1) duty due to a violation of article 
6(1) of the European Convention.  However, delay caused within the courts does not 
breach the section 3(1) obligation, as the courts are not ‘organs of the State’ for the 
purposes of this provision.  It remains to be seen how the case law on this issue will 
further develop in the future.     
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9. The Overall Impact of the European Convention on Human Rights Act in the 
Irish Courts. 
Writing in 2001, Murphy commented that, ‘It is arguable that, apart from District Judges 
being required to give reasoned decisions, it is unlikely that incorporation will have a 
profound impact on the daily routine and decisions of the Irish courts.’142  Nevertheless, it 
seems that the Act is having at least some impact on the outcomes of cases.  For example, 
in Makumbi v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform143 the applicant, who was 
allegedly suicidal, challenged a transfer under the Refugee Act 1996 by way of judicial 
review.  It was argued that implementation of the order would constitute a threat to the 
right to life of the applicant as protected by Article 2 of the European Convention and 
Article 40.3 of the Constitution.  Geoghegan J. stated, 
I am satisfied that it would not be in breach of any rule of interpretation to 
construe the powers and/or duties of the respondent in relation to the 
implementation of a transfer order…as including a discretion not to implement a 
transfer order where to do so would be in breach of the State’s obligations under 
Article 2 of the Convention.144   
A declaration was therefore granted stating that the Minister had a discretion not to 
implement the transfer order and also a power to revoke the order in circumstances in 
which evidence is presented indicating a substantial risk of suicide if the order were to be 
implemented. 
Nevertheless, in many cases plaintiffs submit arguments based both on the Constitution 
and on the Convention provisions, with the courts then deciding the case on the basis of 
the Constitution and noting that the same result would also be obtained using the 
Convention provisions.  For example, in T.H. v DPP and His Honour Judge Peter 
Smithwick,145 the applicant was charged with an offence under the Criminal Law (Rape) 
(Amendment) Act 1990.  The applicant alleged that various irregularities had resulted in 
violations of his rights under both the Constitution and the European Convention.  It was 
held that the delay in question was of a magnitude which violated the right to a 
reasonably expeditious trial under the Constitution.  It was therefore unnecessary to 
consider the case under article 6 of the Convention.  Alternatively, in some instances the 
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courts address cases using the provisions of the Convention, and then state that the same 
result would also have been reached using the Constitution as a basis.  For example, J.F. 
v DPP146 concerned an applicant who had been accused of sexual abuse of a minor.  He 
sought to have the complainant examined by an independent expert.  The complainant, 
who had been examined on six occasions by a psychological expert nominated by the 
DPP, refused this request.  It was held that the refusal of the complainant was 
inconsistent with the right of an accused to call rebutting evidence.  Hardiman J. also held 
that it was inconsistent with the principle of ‘equality of arms’ found in Article 6 of the 
European Convention.  In doing so, she stated, 
I have addressed this case, in part, in terms of the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights out of deference to the arguments addressed to the court 
on that basis and to the aptness of certain of the citations.  I do not believe, 
however, that the Convention in this instance supplies rights lacking in the 
constitutional regime of trial in due course of law; I am quite satisfied that the 
same rights are afforded by domestic law.  Indeed, the fact that the right to 
independent examination of a plaintiff, under pain of the staying of his 
proceedings if refused, has been established in civil proceedings seems to me to 
demonstrate this.147 
Overall, as O’Connell comments, ‘the ECHR Act 2003 itself has not been decisive in 
many cases since incorporation.’148  Nevertheless, for the plaintiffs in the cases in which 
Convention-based arguments did impact upon the outcomes, the 2003 legislation acted as 
a further and effective safeguard for their rights, beyond that of the Constitution.   
10. Conclusion. 
In conclusion therefore, it is certainly true to say that the European Convention on 
Human Rights Act has had much less of an impact on the Irish courts than the Human 
Rights Act has had on the courts of the UK.  However, it is unsurprising that this is the 
case.  Due to the fact that the two statutes follow a very similar legislative scheme, there 
is a temptation to view the two instruments as serving the same purpose.  In one sense, 
they do serve the same function, in that they both essentially incorporate the majority of 
the rights found in the European Convention into domestic law in their respective 
jurisdictions.  However, such an analysis ignores the very different contexts in which the 
two statutes operate.  The purpose of the Human Rights Act was not only to incorporate 
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the Convention rights into domestic law, but was also to provide a bill of rights for a 
country which did not previously possess such an instrument.  By contrast, the purpose of 
the European Convention on Human Rights Act was simply to incorporate the 
Convention provisions into the domestic law of a country which already had a substantial 
bill of rights in its Constitution.  Indeed, one of the reasons why Ireland was the last of 
the member states of the ECHR to incorporate the Convention into domestic law was due 
to a belief that the Irish Constitution already provided a sufficiently strong level of rights 
protection.  The Irish courts had developed a mature body of rights-based jurisprudence 
prior to the enactment of the European Convention on Human Rights Act, and it was 
therefore fairly clear from the outset that the purpose of the Act was simply to 
supplement this case law. 
However, it is also clear that the Irish courts have engaged in a meaningful and 
substantial manner with the Act during the first decade of its operation.  Important 
questions have been settled, such as the relationship between the Act and the 
Constitution.  Nevertheless, there are other factors which limit the impact of the Act.  For 
example, the interpretative obligation found in section 2(1) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights Act is framed in more restrictive terms than that which is contained in 
section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act.  In addition, unlike the approach adopted under the 
Human Rights Act, the Irish courts are not deemed to be ‘organs of the State’ for the 
purposes of the duty to act compatibly with the Convention provisions, as found in 
section 3(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights Act.  This greatly inhibits the 
development of a concept of horizontal effect, although it seems that the Act is having a 
certain degree of horizontal effect in the area of delay in judicial proceedings.  It is true 
that the Act has not affected the outcomes of a large number of cases.  Indeed, in many 
instances the plaintiffs submit arguments based both on the Constitution and on the 
Convention provisions, with the courts then deciding the case on the basis of the 
Constitution and stating that the same conclusion would have been reached using the 
Convention provisions.  Nevertheless, there have been cases in which the Act has 
affected the outcome, and it seems that the Act is essentially operating as a supplement to 
the rights contained in the Constitution, which is precisely what it was intended to be.  It 
will certainly prove interesting to observe how the jurisprudence under the Act will 
develop during the next ten years of its operation.     
 
